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FEE SHIFTING FOR PTAB PROCEEDINGS 
 
Megan M. La Belle† 
Fee shifting in patent litigation has been a hot topic in recent years.  
In Octane Fitness v. ICON and Highmark v. Allcare, the Supreme Court 
made it easier to shift fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which allows courts to 
award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in patent cases.  
Moreover, several bills have been introduced in Congress since 2013 that 
would expand courts’ power beyond the parameters of § 285.  Various 
aspects of these proposals have been heavily debated, including whether 
fee shifting should be mandatory or discretionary, how to recover fees 
from the “real party in interest,” and whether to adopt a one-way or two-
way fee shifting scheme.    
These sort of design choices regarding a fee shifting regime are 
not simply about who should pay for patent litigation.  Fee shifting 
schemes also provide a roadmap from lawmakers about whether and how 
litigation ought to proceed.  Fee shifting regimes, in other words, are used 
to influence litigation conduct.  Thus, if Congress is going to alter the fee 
shifting landscape for patent litigation, it must make careful choices in 
order to incentivize certain types of patent disputes, while simultaneously 
discouraging others.   
This Article does not advocate for a new fee shifting regime for 
patent litigation, nor does it endeavor to design one.  Instead, it focuses on 
one narrow but important question about fee shifting in patent cases that 
has received surprisingly little attention:  whether prevailing parties should 
be able to recover attorney’s fees incurred for litigation before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)—the administrative tribunal of the U.S. 
Patent & Trademark Office that was created by the America Invents Act 
(AIA).  With the steep rise in both PTAB proceedings (post-AIA) and fee 
motions (post-Octane/Highmark), district courts are bound to face this 
question more frequently.  While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has allowed for the recovery of such fees in the past, the Federal 
Circuit’s analysis was flawed in light of Supreme Court precedent.  Thus, 
this Article proposes that Congress enact legislation allowing parties who 
prevail at the PTAB to recover their attorney’s fees.      
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Patent litigation is notoriously expensive.1  Although this 
sentiment has become somewhat of a cliché, it is nonetheless true.  
Depending on the stakes, the median costs for patent litigation range from 
$600,000 (for suits worth less than $1 million) to just under $2 million (for 
suits worth $10 to $25 million).2  Expert witness fees, document 
management and production, and technology-related demonstratives all 
contribute to the expense of patent litigation.3  But most of the money spent 
to adjudicate patent disputes is for attorney’s fees.4  
Acknowledging the high cost of patent litigation, Congress 
created faster and less expensive administrative procedures for 
challenging patents pursuant to the America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011—
the most comprehensive patent reform legislation in fifty years.5  These 
new post-grant proceedings are adjudicated at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), a 
newly-established tribunal of administrative patent judges.6  These 
administrative proceedings have been far more popular than anyone 
anticipated with thousands of petitions for review filed since their 
implementation in 2012.7  
Another way litigants and courts have attempted to address the 
high cost of patent litigation is through fee shifting.  Most civil litigation 
in the United States is governed by the “American Rule,” meaning that 
each party pays his own attorney’s fees.8   Since the 1940s, however, the 
Patent Act has allowed courts to award fees to prevailing patent litigants.9  
Yet, for at least two reasons, fee shifting in patent cases has been relatively 
rare over the past half century.  First, the patent fee shifting provision only 
provides for fees in “exceptional” cases.10  Second, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the court with exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent cases—interpreted “exceptional” very narrowly, 
making fee awards even harder to come by.11     
In recent years, the landscape for fee shifting in patent cases has 
started to change.  The U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases in 2014, 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
1443, 1465 (2014); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 41, 44 (2012); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 77 (2005); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 
467 (2012). 
2 AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2015). Available at 
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/econsurvey/2015EconomicSurvey/Pag
es/default.aspx/.  
3 Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1485. 
4 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 81 (2012).   
5 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
6 Id. §§ 6, 7, 18. 
7 See infra Part III (discussing recent widespread use of post-grant administrative 
proceedings, particularly inter partes review). 
8 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796). 
9 See infra Part II.A (outlining the history of fee shifting in patent cases). 
1035 U.S.C. § 285. 
11 Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
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Octane Fitness v. ICON and Highmark v. Allcare, that make it easier to 
shift fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.12  While it’s too early to know the full 
impact of Octane and Highmark, early empirical evidence shows an 
increase in fee motions being filed and granted.13  What is more, there are 
numerous legislative proposals to broaden fee shifting in patent cases even 
further.14  To be sure, those bills have been stalled on Capitol Hill for some 
time, but there are indications that patent reform may be back on the table 
before long.15   
This confluence of events—meaning the passage of the AIA, the 
dramatic  rise in litigants’ use of PTO administrative proceedings, the  
decisions in Octane and Highmark, and Congress’s focus on fee-shifting 
in patent cases—makes it likely that courts will more frequently confront 
an important question about fee shifting that has received surprisingly little 
attention.  That question is whether § 285, or the new fee shifting statutes 
proposed in Congress, permit prevailing parties in patent cases to recover 
attorney’s fees incurred for proceedings before the PTO.  While the 
Federal Circuit addressed this question almost three decades ago in PPG 
Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc.,16 the court’s 
analysis was flawed in light of Supreme Court precedent.17  Thus, this 
Article calls on the judiciary to revisit PPG, and urges Congress to 
explicitly resolve this issue in any new patent fee-shifting legislation under 
consideration.    
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I compares and contrasts 
the different fee shifting regimes used in civil litigation in the United 
States today, and weighs their costs and benefits.  Part II turns to fee 
shifting in patent cases, and discusses the history of awarding attorney’s 
fees, as well as recent developments in this area from both the judicial and 
legislative branches.   Part III summarizes the case law addressing the 
question whether fees incurred for work before an administrative tribunal 
are encompassed by fee shifting provisions.  Part III then argues that the 
Supreme Court has adopted a clear framework for analyzing such 
questions, but that the Federal Circuit failed to apply this well-established 
precedent when it decided PPG.  Finally, Part IV recommends that either 
the Federal Circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court reconsider PPG, 
and proposes that Congress enact legislation allowing for the recovery of 
attorney’s fees for work before the PTAB. 
 
I. Civil Litigation and Fee Shifting 
 
The question of who pays attorney’s fees in civil litigation is about 
more than money.  Fee shifting regimes are designed to shape litigation 
conduct, for example by incentivizing certain types of lawsuits and 
                                                     
12 See Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014); and 
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).  
13 See infra note 139 (summarizing the findings of recent post-Octane empirical studies). 
14 See infra Part II.D (outlining various legislative proposals to expand fee shifting in patent 
cases). 
15 See, e.g., Hillary Clinton’s Initiative on Technology and Innovation, The Briefing, 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2016/06/27/hillary-clintons-initiative-
on-technology-innovation/ (explaining that Hillary Clinton supports patent reform). 
16 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
17 See infra Parts III and IV. 
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disincentivizing others.  The three primary fee shifting regimes utilized in 
the United States today—no-way fee shifting, one-way fee shifting, and 
two-way fee shifting—reflect different beliefs about the purpose and value 
of litigation in our society.18  The popularity of these fee systems has ebbed 
and flowed as attitudes about civil litigation have changed over time.              
 
A. No-Way Fee Shifting 
 
The norm in the United States is that all litigants, win or lose, pay 
their own attorney’s fees.19  A no-way fee shifting regime, or the 
“American Rule” as it is often called, has been the general practice in this 
country for more than two hundred years.20  It is hard to say why no-way 
fee shifting took root in early America, but scholars have advanced various 
theories.  Some contend the American Rule evolved from the popular view 
of the solitary folk-hero fighting for his rights.21  Others suggest that this 
regime—a sharp departure from the British tradition of awarding fees to 
prevailing parties—developed because of the anti-British sentiment that 
pervaded post-Revolutionary America.22  Still others claim it was 
America’s disdain for lawyers that led to no-way fee shifting; colonists 
distrusted lawyers and thus rejected a rule that allowed for the recovery of 
fees.23        
Whatever the original purpose of no-way fee shifting, today the 
rule is justified primarily as a means for increasing access to justice.24  The 
risk of having to pay an opponent’s attorney’s fees may deter wronged 
parties from filing meritorious lawsuits.25  This risk is particularly acute 
for low-income litigants whose injuries would likely go unremedied in a 
system that shifts fees.26  The American Rule, in other words, “reflects a 
certain wealth consciousness” by helping to level the playing field 
between litigants of modest means and the wealthy, large corporations 
they are usually suing.27 
                                                     
18 Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427, 428 
(1995); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 652-53 (1982). 
19 Rowe, supra note 18, at 651. 
20 Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796). 
21 Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. 
L. REV. 636, 641 (1974). See also Roscoe Pound, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 124 
(1921).  
22 Id. at 117. 
23 Charles Warren, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1911).  (Another theory is that, 
because trials provided a source of entertainment, Americans refused to adopt rules to 
discourage them.)  See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorney’s Fees for Abuses of the Judicial 
System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 616 (1983). 
24 Edward F. Sherman, From “Loser Pays” to Modified Offer of Judgment Rules: 
Reconciling Incentives to Settle With Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1863-64 
(1998). 
25 Id. at 1864; Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting 
in Environmental Litigation and A Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (2004). 
26 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (“[T]he 
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the 
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel.”).  
27 Sherman, supra note 24, at 1865. 
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The unpredictability of civil litigation provides another 
justification for our modern system of no-way fee shifting.28    Estimating 
the probability of success in a lawsuit can be difficult, so litigants 
shouldn’t be punished for merely asserting a claim or defense.29  This is 
especially true for cases raising novel legal theories and other complex 
questions.30  From a societal perspective, novel claims are fundamental 
because they allow the law to evolve, adapt, and modernize—for example, 
with respect to new technologies—often at a much faster pace than if 
lawmaking was left to the legislative body.31  Thus, the American Rule 
facilitates litigation, including litigation of novel legal issues, by 
eliminating the risk of having to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees.32  
The American Rule serves important public interests, namely by 
making courts more accessible to the less fortunate and creating legal 
precedent that develops the law.33  In point of fact, Justice Harlan has 
described our fee shifting regime as “an element of due process.”34  While 
some may be unwilling to go that far, the American Rule is unquestionably 
a deeply-entrenched feature of our jurisprudence.35   
That does not mean, however, that the American Rule is beyond 
reproach; indeed, it has been the subject of much criticism.  For one, critics 
argue that no-way fee systems fail to make prevailing parties whole.36  Not 
only does this strike many as fundamentally unfair, it contradicts basic 
principles of remedies law.37  Commentators also take issue with the 
American Rule for discouraging plaintiffs with low-value claims from 
                                                     
28 Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (“[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one should not be 
penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit….”). 
29 Id. 
30 Silecchia, supra note 25, at 8; Mallor, supra note 23, at 618; Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of 
the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2014); Hylton, supra note 
18, at 439-40. 
31 Hylton, supra note 18, at 445-46; Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea 
or Placebo?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 418 (1995); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, 
Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 306, 329 (2015) (recognizing that novel legal theories 
help develop the law); Daniel J. Solove, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 165-67 (2011) (advocating for a judicial solution to legal issues 
involving changing technologies).   
32 Comment, supra note 21, at 659. 
33 James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English 
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 249 (1995); William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 
J. L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (describing legal precedent as a “public good”). 
34 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971). 
35 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975) (explaining 
that American Rule is “deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy”). 
36 Michael F. Mayer & Wayne Stix, The Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees, 8 
AKRON L. REV. 426 (1975); Rowe, supra note 18, at 657; John F. Vargo, The American 
Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1567, 1592 (1993) (American Rule prevents the “little man” from seeking justice in 
court). 
37 Mayer & Stix, supra note 36, at 426 (“No party in a breach of contract situation…should 
be left following the breach with less in hand than he would have had if his adversary had 
lived up to his bargain.  But…this is precisely what happens under the present cost and 
damage structure when litigation occurs.”); Rowe, supra note 18, at 657 (“Undeniably, the 
American rule’s effect of reducing a successful plaintiff’s recovery by the amount of his 
lawyer’s fee conflicts with the make-whole idea underlying much of the law of remedies.”). 
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bringing suit since any recovery would be swallowed by attorney’s fees.38  
This is most problematic for impoverished plaintiffs who may not be able 
to retain contingency-fee lawyers for cases with little monetary value.39  
On the other hand, the American Rule has been impugned for 
failing to deter—and even encouraging—frivolous litigation.40  Because 
defendants have to pay their own fees, even when they win on the merits, 
settling groundless claims is often less expensive than litigating the case 
to judgment.  In this way, the argument goes, the American Rule functions 
as a sort of “legalized form of blackmail” that clogs our courts and 
undermines our justice system.41       
These shortcomings of the American Rule have led legislatures 
and courts to implement different types of fee-shifting regimes from time 
to time.  One-way fee shifting, by far the more common exception, awards 
fees only to prevailing plaintiffs to address the underenforcement of 
socially-valuable claims, while two-way fee shifting aims to make 
prevailing parties whole and discourages frivolous litigation.  
  
B. One-Way Fee Shifting 
 
For over a century, exceptions to the American Rule were few and 
far between.42  Congress crafted limited exceptions for antitrust, securities, 
copyright, and—most relevant to this article—patent cases.43  Courts, 
relying on their equitable powers, allowed for the recovery of attorney’s 
fees when the losing party acted in bad faith,44 or when the litigation 
benefitted the public, such as cases involving a common fund.45  Because 
these exceptions were relatively rare, they received little attention from 
courts and commentators. 
That changed in the second half of the twentieth century with the 
emergence of public law, or public impact, litigation.46  Public law 
                                                     
38 Mallor, supra note 23, at 616; Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking 
Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 
317, 327 (2005). 
39 Id. at 327. 
40 Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 
75, 78 (1964); Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, The Impact of Frivolous Lawsuits on 
Deterrence: Do They Have Some Redeeming Value?, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 301, 327 
(2014) (switching from American rule to English Rule will discourage frivolous lawsuits). 
41 Kuenzel, supra note 40, at 78; Mallor, supra note 23, at 617. 
42 Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 
1986 DUKE L.J. 435, 435 (1986).   
43 Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 471 (Fed. Circ. 1985) (explaining 
that Patent Act was amended in 1946 to add fee-shifting provision); Michael D. Green, 
From Here to Attorney’s Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in the Journey to the 
Appellate Courts, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 207, 218 (1984) (“Several older statutes, such as the 
Clayton Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Copyright Act authorize fee shifting as 
well.”). 
44 F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. for Use of Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). 
45 John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 849 (1975); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees 
From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974). But see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269 (declining 
to adopt the “private attorney general” exception to the American Rule in federal court). 
46 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1284 (1976); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 
48-49 (2012). 
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litigation began with structural challenges by public interest groups to 
segregated schools and other government institutions.47  But soon the pool 
of challengers expanded to individuals who were incentivized by 
lawmakers to privately enforce public laws.48 These so-called “private 
attorney generals” were incentivized, of course, by the prospect of 
recovering damages in many cases.  Even more important were the one-
way fee shifting provisions included in civil rights and environmental 
legislation that entitled only prevailing plaintiffs to attorney’s fees.49   
The idea behind one-way fee shifting is relatively straightforward.    
Certain areas of substantive law—civil rights, environmental, and 
consumer protection, for example—are socially valuable, and so 
enforcement is particularly important.50  While government agencies 
police and enforce such laws, limited resources and personnel mean that 
some violators go unpunished.51  One alternative is for private citizens 
(and their lawyers) to step in and fill that gap.  But for that to work, the 
potential benefits of litigation must outweigh its costs.52  Various means 
could be used in an attempt to tip the scales in favor of litigation.  
Lawmakers could provide for enhanced damages, lower the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof, increase the availability of class relief, or allow third 
parties to finance litigation.53  For the most part, though, legislatures have 
opted instead for fee-shifting rules that advantage plaintiffs.   
By the 1990s, there were over 2,000 fee shifting statutes in the 
United States, the vast majority of which operate one way in favor of 
plaintiffs.54  The general consensus is that these laws have worked as 
intended, meaning they have improved—although certainly not 
                                                     
47 Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“Structural reform is premised on the notion that the 
quality of our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of large-scale 
organizations, not just by individuals acting either beyond or within these organizations.”). 
48 La Belle, supra note 46, at 48-49. 
49 Rowe, supra note 18, at 662-63. 
50 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (civil rights suits); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1365 (d); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1988); Equal Access to Justice Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).  (Some of these Acts provide for one-way fee shifting on their face, 
while others have been interpreted by courts—based on legislative history—to sometimes 
allow fee shifting only in favor of prevailing plaintiffs).  See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment 
Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978); Razore v. Tulalip Tribes 
of Washington, 66 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Paul Taylor, The Difference Between 
Filing Lawsuits and Selling Widgets: The Lost Understanding That Some Attorneys' 
Exercise of State Power Is Subject to Appropriate Regulation, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 45, 58 
(2005) (“By the 1980’s, the Supreme Court went even further by reading one-way fee-
shifting statutes broadly and encouraging enforcement under such statutes in a way that 
tended to grant fees to prevailing plaintiffs while denying them to prevailing defendants.”). 
51 See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2014); 
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2002). 
52 See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2048-50 
(1993) [hereinafter Krent, Explaining] (“[F]ee shifting may…be an effective way for 
Congress to deter wrongdoing or, in other words, to improve the primary conduct of both 
the government and private firms.”). 
53 Id. at 2048-49, 2048 n.39; Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic 
Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & POL'Y 645, 645 (2012). 
54 Vargo, supra note 36, at 1629; Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea or 
Placebo?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 416 (1995).  
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perfected—access to justice for plaintiffs.55  Indeed, some commentators 
believe that one-way fee shifting works too well in that it facilitates 
frivolous claims along with meritorious ones.56  As a result, defendants 
subject to one-way fee-shifting provisions are often forced to settle 
meritless suits because litigating is just too risky. 57 
On the flip side, one-way fee shifting is criticized for having a 
dampening effect on settlement.  Simply put, the rule may discourage 
settlement because plaintiffs have little to lose and much to gain from 
litigating to judgment.58  For this criticism to be persuasive, we must 
suppose that settlement is the ultimate goal; that it’s always the best way 
to resolve litigation.  Yet, in some cases—particularly the type of public 
law litigation where one-way fee shifting is used—adjudicating to final 
judgment is a better solution than settling.59  Thus, by discouraging 
settlement, one-way fee shifting is arguably working exactly how 
intended.       
As quickly as support for one-way fee shifting grew in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the momentum faded by the end of the twentieth century.  
Where lawmakers, courts, and the public once favored fee shifting that 
spurs litigation,60 the focus  moved to fee shifting that hampers litigation.  
There was supposedly a “litigation explosion” plaguing our judicial 
system that two-way fee shifting would help fix.61  
 
  
                                                     
55 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741 (1986) (finding that “the Fees Act has given the 
victims of civil rights violations a powerful weapon that improves their ability to employ 
counsel, to obtain access to the courts, and thereafter to vindicate their rights by means of 
settlement or trial”); Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in A Diverse Mass Society, 8 
J.L. & POL’Y 385, 390 (2000) (“There are many grounds for pride in our successes in 
opening up the adjudication system to all…includ[ing]…statutes...providing for fee 
shifting….”).  But see Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 
721-22 (2010) (“The overall impact of…fee-shifting statutes on access to justice has been 
limited at best….”). 
56 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 587 n. 211 
(1997); Jeffrey C. Bright, Unilateral Attorney's Fees Clauses: A Proposal to Shift to the 
Golden Rule, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 85, 108 (2012); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the 
Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 153 (1984). 
57 See, e.g., Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1971) (“One-
sided attorney's fees clauses can thus be used as instruments of oppression to force 
settlements of dubious or unmeritorious claims.”). 
58 Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by 
Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2015) (“[B]ecause [fee-shifting] 
amplifies the parties’ relative optimism and degree of information asymmetry, fee-shifting 
discourages settlement under most economic models.”); Robert S. Miller, Attorneys' Fees 
for Contractual Non-Signatories Under California Civil Code Section 1717: A Remedy in 
Search of a Rationale, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 535, 541 (1995). 
59 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). 
60 See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 760 (2010) 
(scholars commonly argue that one-way fee shifting “increase[s] the overall number of 
actions filed”).  But see Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 585, 593 (6th ed. 
2003) (“[O]ne-way indemnity may not even generate more litigation than the American 
(no-indemnity) rule does.”).  
61Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial 
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 985 (2003); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform 
as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 829 (1993).  
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C. Two-Way Fee Shifting 
 
The claim that the U.S. justice system was in crisis and was 
suffering from a litigation explosion became ubiquitous by the late 
1980s.62 Politicians, big companies, and the popular media subscribed to 
the notion that overly litigious plaintiffs (and their lawyers) were 
burdening our courts and needed to be reined in.63  Though little empirical 
evidence supported these allegations,64 the Bush administration joined the 
chorus and called for litigation reform.65  To this end, then-Vice President 
Dan Quayle was appointed to lead the Council on Competitiveness, an 
organization committed to protecting American business interests.66  
After conducting hearings, the Quayle Council published its 
Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in 1991.67  Among its many proposals 
was the recommendation that two-way fee shifting, or the English Rule, 
be implemented in federal diversity suits.68  A “loser pays” rule arguably 
reduces the number of baseless lawsuits, encourages meritorious ones, and 
makes prevailing parties whole.69  Moreover, parties subject to two-way 
fee shifting are less likely to engage in excessive discovery and motion 
practice.70      
This movement toward the English system gained some traction 
in the 1990s.  Not only was the public’s interest in the topic piqued,71 
lawmakers gave it serious consideration too.  A loser pays bill passed the 
House of Representatives,72 Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act with a two-way fee shifting provision,73 and a few 
states adopted loser pays statutes for certain types of civil suits.74  With 
time, however, the fervor for fee shifting waned due in part to the Clinton 
Administration’s opposition to loser pay rules as “tilt[ing] the legal 
playing field dramatically to the disadvantage of consumers and middle-
                                                     
62 See, e.g., Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 
199 (1991). 
63 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev. 
1093, 1094-95 (1996); Miller, supra note 61, at 985-86. 
64 Galanter, supra note 63, at 1098. 
65 Symposium on Civil Justice Reform: Forward, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (1993). 
66 Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 627-28 (2010). 
67 Id. at 628. 
68 Mark S. Stein, Is One-Way Fee Shifting Fairer than Two-Way Fee Shifting?, 141 F.R.D. 
351, 351 (1992). 
69 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 525 (1994) (“The most common reason 
advanced in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney's fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright 
infringement.”); Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1161, 1161 (1996).   
70 Olson & Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1162. 
71 Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea or Placebo?, 71 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 
415, 415 (1995). 
72 141 Cong. Rec. H2749-02 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1995) (Roll Call Vote No. 207). 
73 15 U.S.C. §§77z-1(c), 78u-4(c) (2000). 
74 Olson & Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1175-80. 
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class citizens.”75  This is especially true for those plaintiffs relying on 
contingency fee arrangements.76   
For the past two decades, civil litigation reform has taken a 
different course.  The judiciary—the Supreme Court in particular—has 
addressed topics ranging from pleading standards to class certification to 
arbitration clauses to personal jurisdiction.77  The Court’s decisions on all 
these matters are considered “pro-defendant,” in that they make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to sue.78  So while widespread two-way fee shifting 
failed to take root in the U.S., the landscape of our civil litigation system 
has been transformed nonetheless.  
Despite these substantial changes, there have been calls for further 
reform with respect to patent litigation.79  Similar to the rhetoric of the late 
twentieth century, critics say we have a patent litigation “crisis” or 
“explosion” on our hands.80  They claim that this crisis has been caused 
primarily by patent assertion entities (PAEs), more pejoratively known as 
“patent trolls,” which are companies that own and enforce patents, but do 
not practice them.81  PAEs—much like the supposedly overly-litigious 
plaintiffs of the early 1990s—rely heavily on contingency fee 
arrangements.82  Thus, numerous bills have been introduced in Congress 
to overhaul the way patent cases are litigated.83  Although the Patent Act 
already allows for fee-shifting in exceptional cases,84 many of these bills 
feature robust fee shifting provisions.         
 
II. Fee Shifting in Patent Cases 
 
Two-way fee shifting is rare in the United States, yet has been 
available in patent cases for the past seventy years.  That said, Congress 
intended fee shifting to be invoked only in a small subset of patent cases.  
Courts have heeded that advice, limiting fee shifting in some 
circumstances perhaps even more than Congress had expected.  The 
questions now facing Congress are whether the time has come to re-tool 
the patent fee shifting statute to make it broader and, if so, what that new 
statute should look like.     
                                                     
75 53 Cong. Q. 744, 745 (Mar. 11, 1995) (quoting letter from Attorney General Janet Reno 
and White House Counsel Abner J. Mikva to House Speaker Newt Gingrich).  
76 Mallor, supra note 23, at 618 (“Even a litigant who had a contingent fee arrangement 
with his own attorney would be deterred from filing suit; this would cancel the benefit of 
the contingency fee as a means of financing litigation for litigants of modest means.”). 
77 Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
465, 471-72 (2012). 
78 Id. at 472-74. 
79 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 281 (2015). 
80 See, e.g., Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can 
Solve It, 23 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 1 (2009); James Bessen & Michael J. 
Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 402 (2013). 
81 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, 
and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. 
REV. 1571, 1573-74 (2009). 
82 See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 
64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 355-56 (2012). 
83 Gugliuzza, supra note 79, at 281. 
84 35 U.S.C. § 285. 




A. History of § 285  
 
Historically, patent cases were governed by the American Rule 
like most other types of civil suits.85  That changed in 1946 when Congress 
amended the Patent Act to provide for two-way fee shifting.  The purpose 
of this new law was two-fold.  First, Congress believed it would deter 
willful infringement “by anyone thinking that all he would be required to 
pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty.”86  Second, two-way fee shifting 
would “enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged 
infringer.”87     
  The original patent fee shifting statute, then-codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 70, stated that a court “may in its discretion award reasonable attorney’s 
fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent 
case.”88  On its face, the statute lacked guidance about when to award fees.  
But the legislative history and cases interpreting § 70 make clear that fee 
shifting was reserved for “extraordinary circumstances,” such as cases 
involving inequitable conduct or vexatious litigation.89  
The Patent Act of 1952 amended the fee shifting statute and 
recodified it at 35 U.S.C. § 285, where it remains in the same form today.  
Section 285, in its entirety, provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases 
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”90  While the 
language differed from the 1946 version, Congress did not intend to 
change the substance of the statute.91  Instead, this was a clarifying 
amendment to “expres[s] the intention of the [1946] statute as shown by 
its legislative history and as interpreted by the courts.”92  Thus, in the 
decades after recodification—just as in the years before—district courts     
interpreted and applied the patent fee shifting statute in a discretionary 
manner, considering the totality of the circumstances and deciding 
whether a particular case was “exceptional” to warrant fees.93 
Although the 1952 Act did not change the way courts approached 
fee shifting, it overhauled many other features of the patent system.94  The 
Act strengthened patent owners’ rights, ultimately leading to more 
applications at the PTO and more issued patents.95  At the same time, 
                                                     
85 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1753 (2014).   
86 S. Rep. No. 1503 (1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387.  
87 Id. 
88 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946 ed.). 
89 See Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F.2d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 1951); 
Park-in-Theaters, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th Cir. 1951); S. Rep. No. 1503 
(1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387.  
90 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
91 Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1753; 1 PATENT LAW CODIFICATION & REVISION 77, 108-09 (1952).   
92 Id. at 1753 n.2. 
93 Id.  at 1753. 
94 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2221-24 (2000). 
95 Id. (discussing how the 1952 Act benefitted patent owners); Craig Allen Nard, American 
Patent Law With European and TRIPS Comparative Perspectives, (“The 1952 Act did a 
great deal to strengthen our patent system”); James E. Daily & F. Scott Kieff, Anything 
Under the Sun Made by Humans: Patent Law Doctrines As Endogenous Institutions for 
Commercializing Innovation, 62 EMORY L.J. 967, 971 n.15 (2013) (“Diverse jurists 
immediately recognized the power of the 1952 Act in strengthening patents….”).  
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courts were invalidating patents at very high rates,96 and the circuits were 
sharply divided on many substantive patent law doctrines.97  This fracture 
among the courts created a sense of unfairness, generated instability, and 
promoted forum shopping in patent cases.98  In an effort to address these 
deficiencies, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1982.99                           
 
B.  The Federal Circuit’s Approach to Fee Shifting 
 
The primary purpose of the Federal Circuit was to bring greater 
uniformity to patent law.100  The idea was that a “single court of appeals 
for patent cases [would] promote certainty,”101 and so the Federal Circuit 
was granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction over most patent-related 
cases.   Commentators generally agree that the Federal Circuit has taken 
this congressional mandate to heart, and patent doctrine has become more 
uniform over the past three decades.102   
One way the Federal Circuit has accomplished this uniformity 
goal is by preferring bright-line rules to more flexible standards.103  There 
is a rich literature discussing this trend in the Federal Circuit and the 
impact it has had on patent law.104  The court adopted such bright-line rules 
for patentable subject matter, obviousness, declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction, and permanent injunctions, to name just a few.105   
The Federal Circuit’s proclivity toward bright-line rules is 
similarly apparent in its fee shifting jurisprudence.  As noted above, for a 
long time after the 1952 Act, district courts decided exceptionalism for fee 
shifting purposes under a totality of the circumstances test.106  But that 
                                                     
96 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206 n.53 (1998) (reporting that in the 1970s, only about thirty-
five percent of litigated patents were held valid). 
97 David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and 
Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 468 (2013). 
98 See Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Comm'n on Revision of the 
Fed. Court Appellate Sys. Structure & Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change 
(1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (“[D]isparity in results in different circuits leads 
to widespread forum shopping….[which] ‘demeans the entire judicial process and the 
patent system as well.’”); Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 
AZ. ST. L.J. 63, 83-84 (2015). 
99 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25.  
100 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (“Patent litigation long has been identified as a 
problem area, characterized by undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency in 
adjudications.”); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The creation of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of the law. Such 
uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation.”). 
101 H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 23. 
102 Megan M. La Belle, Local Rules, supra note 97, at 84.   
103 Taylor, supra note 96 at 478. 
104 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); David 
O. Taylor, supra note 96 at 468-69; John R. Thomas, Formalism and Antiformalism in 
Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 468 (2013); John 
R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 794 (2003). 
105 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 136 (2010) (patentable subject matter); KSR 
Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (obviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (declaratory judgment jurisdiction); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (permanent injunctions). 
106 Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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changed in 2005 when the Federal Circuit rejected this well-established, 
malleable standard in Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc.107  
The accused infringer in Brooks Furniture sought a declaratory 
judgment of noninfringement and invalidity with respect to a design patent 
for rocking chair trim.108  The district court granted summary judgment of 
noninfringement, determined the case was exceptional under § 285, and 
awarded attorney’s fees.109  The court awarded fees because it believed the 
patent owner’s litigation tactics were inappropriate and its infringement 
position was frivolous.110  
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal and announced a new rule 
for deciding whether a case is exceptional under § 285.  Cases are 
exceptional, the court explained, in only two circumstances.111  First, 
“when there has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the 
matter in litigation.”112  Such conduct might include willful infringement, 
fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during 
litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, or conduct that violates 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.113   
Second, a case may be deemed exceptional if the litigation was 
brought in subjective bad faith and the litigation is objectively baseless.  A 
prevailing defendant must prove, in other words, that the plaintiff actually 
knew the litigation was objectively basis.114  And the defendant can only 
do that, the Federal Circuit pronounced, with clear and convincing 
evidence because “[t]here is a presumption that the assertion of 
infringement of a duly granted patent is made in good faith.”115  Applying 
this new test, the court reversed the fee award in Brooks Furniture because 
the accused infringer could not prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the patent owner knew its case was objectively baseless.116 
Like in Brooks Furniture, prevailing defendants in patent cases 
generally have struggled to recover attorney’s fees.117  A recent study by 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat analyzed over 200 fee awards from 2003-2013 and 
found that only 29% of the fee awards that are granted go to defendants, 
with 71% going to plaintiffs.118  Notably, however, Vishnubhakat found 
that in the rare instances when defendants were awarded fees, the median 
                                                     
107 See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
108 Id. at 1379-80. 
109 Id. at 1380. 
110 Id. at 1382. 
111 Id. at 1381-82. 
112 Id. at 1381. 
113 Id.  
114 iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The Federal Circuit 
in iLOR also clarified that “objectively baseless” means “so unreasonable that no 
reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed.”  Id. at 1378.  
115 Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1382. 
116 Id. at 1385. 
117 See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59, 81 tbl. 6 (2012) (finding that 68% of fee awards were to plaintiffs 
and 32% to defendants); Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 
18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 59, 87-88 (2013) (finding that 68% of fee awards were to plaintiffs 
and 32% to defendants); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really 
Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 15, 25 (2014) (finding that 71% of fee awards were to 
plaintiffs and 29% to defendants). 
118 Id.   
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amounts were much higher than for plaintiffs.119  The study further 
concludes that fee awards vary by district and based on the underlying 
technology.120      
Though difficult to prove empirically, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule in Brooks Furniture is 
one of the reasons that fee awards for defendants have been so elusive.  In 
some cases, district courts refused to award fees because the Brooks 
Furniture framework was not met,121 while in others the district court 
awarded fees only to be reversed by the Federal Circuit.122  As with many 
areas of patent law, commentators called for reform and the Supreme 
Court stepped in.123   
        
C. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Fee Shifting 
 
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided two cases—Octane Fitness 
LLC v. ICON Health and Fitness, Inc. and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare 
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.—that have turned the tide for fee shifting in patent 
cases.  Octane addressed the question of what makes a case “exceptional” 
under § 285, while Highmark addressed the standard that appellate courts 
should use in reviewing fee decisions.    Consistent with recent trends in 
the patent space,124 the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in both 
cases. 
Octane involved a patent dispute over an elliptical exercise 
machine.125  ICON, the patent owner, sued Octane for infringement in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.  After prevailing on a 
motion for summary judgment based on noninfringement, Octane sought 
attorney’s fees.126  The court denied the fee motion under the Brooks 
Furniture rule, finding that ICON’s claim was neither objectively baseless 
nor brought in subjective bad faith.127  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed rejecting Octane’s argument that the Brooks Furniture rule was 
“overly restrictive.”128   
The Supreme Court granted Octane’s petition for certiorari and 
reversed, explaining that the Brooks Furniture framework is “unduly 
rigid” and “encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district 
courts.”129  In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the plain 
language of § 285, which simply requires that a case be “exceptional” to 
warrant a fee award.  Because the Patent Act does not define 
                                                     
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 26-29. 
121 See, e.g., Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1755. 
122 See, e.g., Highmark, 134 S.Ct. at 1747. 
123 See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Op-Ed, Making Patent 
Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013, at A25. 
124 See, e.g., Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship 
With the Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275, 278-82 (2012) 
(discussing trends in the Supreme Court’s patent opinions). 
125 Octane, 134 S.Ct. at 1754. 
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“exceptional,” the Court ascribed the term its ordinary meaning: 
uncommon, rare, or not ordinary.130   
Thus, the Court held, a case is exceptional under § 285 as long as 
it “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a 
party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the 
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was 
litigated.”131  The Court went on to say that lower courts should decide 
exceptionalism on a case-by-case basis considering the totality of the 
circumstances.132  Hence, Octane—like many other recent Supreme Court 
patent decisions—rejected the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule for a more 
flexible standard. 
Highmark, the companion case to Octane, addressed the 
appropriate standard of review for fee shifting decisions.  Highmark, Inc., 
a health insurance company, filed an action in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas against Allcare Health, the owner of a patent 
covering “utilization review” in managed health care systems.133  
Highmark sought a declaratory judgment that Allcare’s patent was invalid, 
unenforceable, and not infringed, and Allcare counterclaimed for 
infringement.134  The district court entered summary judgment of 
noninfringement in favor of Highmark.  
Highmark then filed a motion for attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285.  The district court determined that the case was exceptional because 
Allcare engaged in “vexatious” and “deceitful” litigation conduct, and 
pursued infringement claims despite its own experts demonstrating that 
such claims lacked merit.135  Accordingly, the district court granted the 
motion and awarded Highmark more than $5 million in fees.136  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit—applying a de novo standard of review—reversed the 
exceptional case determination with respect to one of the patent claims in 
issue.137   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Highmark and once again 
reversed the Federal Circuit.  Relying on Octane, the Court held that the 
question whether a case is “exceptional” is committed to the discretion of 
the district court.138  Thus, the Court explained, all aspects of the § 285 
determination are reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion, not de 
novo as was the Federal Circuit’s practice.139   
Taken together, Octane and Highmark have the potential to shift 
the landscape of patent litigation.  While it’s still too soon to understand 
the full impact of these cases, early studies suggest that parties are bringing 
fee motions at higher rates, courts are more willing to grant them, and 
accused infringers are more likely to recover than in the pre-Octane era.140  
                                                     
130 Id. at 1756. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 134 S.Ct. at 1747. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1748. 
139 Id. at 1749. 
140 See, e.g., Hannah Jiam, Fee Shifting and Octane Fitness: An Empirical Approach 
Toward Understanding “Exceptionalsim,” 30 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 611, 623, 630 (2015) 
FEE SHIFTING FOR PTAB PROCEEDINGS 
15 
 
Whatever changes they ultimately achieve, Octane and Highmark are 
probably not a panacea for the problems supposedly plaguing our patent 
litigation system.141  Consequently, reformers continue to advocate for a 
broader fee-shifting statute for patent cases.       
 
D. Legislative Proposals for Fee Shifting 
 
Congress passed the America Invents Act, the most significant 
overhaul to the U.S. patent system in over half a century, in 2011.142  Yet, 
less than two years later, calls for further reform began.  More than a dozen 
bills were introduced in Congress between 2013 and 2015, many of which 
included fee shifting provisions.143  The fee provisions in these bills varied.  
Some were one-way awarding fees only to the accused infringer, while 
others were two-way allowing either prevailing party to recover.144  
Certain of these bills targeted PAEs, while others drew no distinctions 
based on the identity of the parties.145     
This legislative effort culminated with two leading bills emerging 
from the House and the Senate.  The Innovation Act—the House version 
of the bill—and the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship 
(PATENT) Act—the Senate version of the bill—contain relatively similar 
fee shifting provisions.146  Although a detailed analysis of these provisions 
is beyond the scope of this Article, a few key points should be highlighted.  
First, the bills are two-way, meaning a court may award fees to 
either a prevailing patent owner or accused infringer.147  Second, both bills 
make fee shifting mandatory unless the court finds that (1) the losing 
party’s position and conduct was reasonable, or (2) special circumstances 
(e.g., undue economic hardship) would make an award unjust.148  Third, 
the bills contemplate the joinder of interested parties to facilitate the 
recovery of fees.149  Fourth, the bills include exceptions for universities 
and certain technology transfer organizations.150  Finally, and most 
                                                     
(finding that  the number of fees motion has risen and courts are more likely to grant those 
motions post Octane); Mallun Yen, Fee-Shifting Before and After the Supreme Court 
Decisions, INSIDE COUNSEL, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/02/25/fee-shifting-
before-and-after-the-supreme-court-de (Feb. 25, 2015) (finding that accused infringers are 
winning fee awards at higher rates than before Octane). 
141 See, e.g., Eric Coe, Collecting Fees Still Tough After Octane, Highmark Cases, LAW 
360 (Aug. 28, 2015) (discussing the limitations on fee shifting even after Octane and 
Highmark); Yen, supra note 139 (“reformers assert that fee-shifting won’t be truly 
effective without further legislation”). 
142 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
143 See Patent Progress, Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, 
available at http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-
progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (collecting and summarizing patent reform bills 
that have been introduced since 2013); Gugliuzza, supra note 79, at 281 (discussing various 
bills and their provisions).   
144 Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1493-94. 
145 Id. 
146 Innovation Act, H.R. 9 (2015); PATENT Act, S. 1137 (2015).   
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pertinent to this Article, both bills allow for the recovery of fees incurred 
“in connection with a civil action.”151           
What neither the Innovation Act nor the PATENT Act (nor any 
other bill for that matter) clarifies is what it means to incur fees “in 
connection with a civil action.”  Does that only include fees for work 
before the district court?  Or does it also include fees for proceedings 
conducted before an administrative body, namely the PTO?  In light of the 
steep rise in the use of PTO proceedings since the AIA,152 these are 
important questions to answer.    
  
III. Fee Shifting for Administrative Proceedings 
     
The AIA effected major changes in American patent law.  Our 
priority system switched from a first-to-invent to first-to-file,153 the 
definition of prior art expanded,154 and the ability to join defendants in 
patent suits was restricted.155  Perhaps the most substantial change, 
however, was the creation of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) 
and various administrative proceedings for challenging patent validity at 
the PTO.156  Though the PTO conducted post-grant proceedings before the 
AIA, Congress designed the new proceedings—including inter partes 
review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and covered business method 
review (CBM)—so they would be more effective for litigants.157  That is 
to say, Congress hoped to encourage the use of PTAB proceedings as a 
means of streamlining and reducing the cost of patent litigation.158      
PTAB proceedings, it turns out, are far more popular than anyone 
anticipated.159  Between September 16, 2012 (when the AIA became 
effective) and June 30, 2016, 5,202 PTAB petitions were filed (4,704 
IPRs, 469 CBMs, and 29 PGRs).160  Early data show that challengers are 
enjoying high rates of success at the PTAB, meaning that a significant 
                                                     
151 Id. 
152 See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 93 (2014) (“In the roughly two years since 
inter partes review… replaced inter partes reexamination, petitioners have filed almost 
two thousand requests for the Patent Trial and Appeal Board…to review the validity of 
issued US patents.”). 
153 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note __, § 3. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. § 19 at 331-33. 
156 Id. §§ 6, 7, 18 at 299-316, 329-31. 
157 Id. §§ 6, 18. For example, PTAB proceedings are resolved much faster than their 
predecessors, the estoppel provisions are more forceful, and there are additional procedural 
protections, including the right to discovery and an oral hearing.  Id. §§ 6, 18.   
158 See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of 
II, 21 FED. CIR B.J. 539, 653 (2012). 
159 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit A Run for Its Money: 
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 251 (2015) (“[T]hese 
statistics speak loudly about the public’s eagerness and ability to use these procedures to 
‘weed out’ bad patents….”).  
160 United States Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-29%20PTAB.pdf 
(Feb. 29, 2016).  PGR applies only to those patents issued under the new first-to-file 
system, and very few first-to-file patents have been issued so far.  
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percentage of patent claims have been cancelled.161  There is also evidence 
that the vast majority of PTAB proceedings involve parallel district court 
litigation.162  The popularity of these proceedings has led some critics to 
refer to the PTAB as a “death squad”163 and “killing field.”164  Other 
commentators claim the PTAB is simply doing what Congress intended: 
eliminating bad patents.165   
Without wading into this debate, what’s clear is that patent owners 
and accused infringers alike are expending significant resources, including 
attorney’s fees, on PTAB proceedings.  The median cost of IPR, for 
example, is $275,000 through the PTAB hearing or $350,000 if appealed 
to the Federal Circuit.166  So, if a prevailing party in a patent litigation is 
entitled to recover reasonable expenses and fees, does that include fees for 
work before the PTO?  Notably, this question is not one of first impression 
for the Federal Circuit, as the court addressed it almost three decades ago 
in PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc. in the context 
of pre-AIA administrative proceedings.167  The decision in PPG, which I 
argue is flawed, is explored below in Subsection C.  Before addressing 
PPG, however, this Part provides a summary of the Supreme Court’s and 
other Circuit Courts’ jurisprudence on fee shifting for administrative 
proceedings outside of the patent context.                     
 
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence   
 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a substantial expansion of the 
administrative state with the creation of agencies like the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), among many others.168  Concomitantly, 
Congress was enacting civil rights and environmental legislation that 
                                                     
161 Love & Ambwani, supra note 151, at 101-02.  A more recent study shows that, since 
2012, the rate at which the PTAB is invalidating claims has slowly and consistently 
declined.  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai, & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making 
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 45, 78 (2016).   
162 Love & Ambwani, supra note 151, at 103 (finding that in 80% of IPRs the challenged 
patent was also asserted in litigation between petitioner and respondent); Vishnubhakat, et 
al., supra note 161, at 69 (finding that about 87.6% of IPR- and CBM-challenged patents 
are also being litigated in federal court). 
163 Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are all Commercially Viable Patents 
Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-
patents-invalid/id=48642/ (quoting the comments of former Federal Circuit Chief Judge 
Randall Rader made at the 2013 AIPLA annual meeting in Washington, DC).   
164 Erich Spangenberg, Patent Predictions for 2015, IPNAV BLOG (Jan. 2015), available at 
http://www.ipnav.com/blog/erich-spangenbergs-patent-predictions-for-2015/.   
165 See Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW 
360 (Aug. 14, 2014) (quoting the former Chief Judge of the PTAB, James Smith, as saying 
that if the PTAB was not “doing some ‘death squadding,’ [it] would not be doing what the 
[AIA] calls on [the PTAB] to do”); Dreyfuss, supra note 158, at 255 (saying that many 
claims cancelled by the PTAB “deserve to die”). 
166 LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015 38 (2015). 
167 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
168 See Kristen Hickman & Richard Pierce, Jr., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2010). 
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included fee shifting provisions to encourage enforcement of these new 
rights.169  It comes as no surprise, then, that courts soon faced the question 
whether prevailing parties—absent explicit guidance from Congress—
may recover attorney’s fees for work performed before administrative 
tribunals.  
1. Fee Shifting in Civil Rights Cases 
 
Beginning in 1980, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases 
addressing this question in the civil rights context.  The first case, New 
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,170  involved a plaintiff who claimed she 
was denied a position as a cocktail waitress because of her race.171  As 
required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff Carey filed a 
complaint with the EEOC, and the EEOC referred her complaint to the 
New York State Division of Human Rights (“Division”).172  The Division 
found probable cause that Carey had been unlawfully discriminated 
against and, after a hearing, ordered New York Gaslight Club (“Club”) to 
offer her employment and pay back wages.173   
While the Club appealed the Division’s decision, Carey pursued 
her EEOC charge.  Relying largely on the Division’s findings, the EEOC 
also found probable cause and issued Carey a right to sue letter.174  Carey 
then filed suit under Title VII in federal district court in New York seeking 
damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees.175  Soon after filing the 
federal action, the Division’s decision was affirmed on appeal and the 
Club agreed to comply with the Division’s order.176  Thus, the only issue 
remaining for the court was Carey’s request for attorney’s fees, the vast 
majority of which were incurred for work before the Division and 
EEOC.177  The district court refused to award Carey fees, the Second 
Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.178    
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit holding that 
Carey was entitled to recover attorney’s fees incurred in connection with 
the administrative proceedings.  The Court began its analysis with the 
language of the relevant fee shifting provision, section 706(k) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  Section 706(k) provided that “[i]n any action or 
proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”179  The fact that the statute 
referred not only to “action” but to “proceeding” was critically important 
to the Court.  “The words of § 706(k) leave little doubt that fee awards are 
authorized for legal work done in ‘proceedings’ other than court 
                                                     
169 See supra Part I.B. 
170 New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). 
171 Id. at 56. 
172 Id at 57.  
173 Id.   
174 Id. at 58. 
175 Carey, 447 U.S. at 58. 
176 Id. at 58-59. 
177 Id. at 59.   
178 Id. at 59-60. 
179 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k) (emphasis added).   
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actions.”180  This is particularly true where, as here, the administrative 
proceedings in question were mandatory.181 
What is more, the Carey Court opined, this plain language 
interpretation of § 706(k) is supported by the legislative history.  Allowing 
a prevailing plaintiff like Carey to recover fees for administrative 
proceedings furthers the objective of § 706(k), namely to “facilitate the 
bringing of discrimination complaints.”182  A contrary rule would force 
victims of discrimination to bear the costs of mandatory administrative 
proceedings, which no doubt would deter the enforcement of many 
meritorious civil rights claims.183          
The second case in the trilogy—Webb v. Dyer County Board of 
Education—presented a similar set of facts as Carey, but involved a 
different statutory scheme.184  Leonard Webb, a schoolteacher, claimed he 
was terminated on the basis of his race and pursued administrative 
remedies as provided by Tennessee law.  After several hearings, the Board 
of Education of Dyer County, Tennessee, upheld Webb’s dismissal.185  
Webb then filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 
violations of civil rights laws and the constitution.  The lawsuit ultimately 
settled with a consent order pursuant to which Webb was reinstated to his 
former teaching position and awarded $15,400 in damages.186  Webb 
subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1988, seeking to recover, inter alia, fees incurred during the administrative 
proceedings.187  The district court rejected Webb’s request for such fees, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.188  
This time, the Court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover fees 
for time spent in administrative proceedings.  As in Carey, the Court 
started with the relevant statutory language and found that § 1988, like § 
706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, authorizes an award of attorney’s fees in 
“any action or proceeding to enforce a provision” of this title.189  The 
Court nonetheless distinguished Carey on the grounds that the 
administrative proceedings in that case were mandatory.  Webb, on the 
other hand, was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before 
suing under § 1983; the administrative proceedings Webb pursued were 
optional.190   The Court then explained that work completed during 
optional administrative proceedings might be compensable if it was “both 
useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance” the litigation.191  
                                                     
180 Carey, 447 U.S. at 61. 
181 Id. at 63. 
182 Id. at 63. 
183 Id. 
184 Webb, 471 U.S. 234 (1985). 
185 Id. at 236-37. 
186 Id. at 237. 
187 Id. at 238. 
188 Id.  
189 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) (emphasis added). 
190 Webb v. Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 at 241 (1985); see also Marjorie A. Silver, Evening 
the Odds: The Case for Attorneys’ Fee Awards for Administrative Resolution of Title VI 
and Title VII Disputes, 67 N.C. L. REV. 379391-92 (1989) (“It is evidence that the Webb 
majority saw a clear distinction between the mandatory nature of the state proceedings 
under Title VII in Carey and the optional state proceedings pursued by plaintiff in Webb.”). 
191 Webb, 471 U.S. at 243. 
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Because Webb failed to make such a showing, the district court properly 
denied fees.192   
North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street 
Community Council, Inc. is the third case in the civil rights trilogy.193  In 
Crest, the plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the U.S. 
Department of Transportation challenging a plan to build a federally-
funded highway through a predominantly black neighborhood as violative 
of Title VI of the civil rights laws.194  The parties settled the administrative 
dispute, and plaintiff subsequently filed an action in federal court 
exclusively to recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the courts of appeal were split 
on the question whether such an independent action for fees is 
sustainable.195    
In a decision that has drawn significant criticism,196 the Court held 
that plaintiffs could not file a separate lawsuit under § 1988 to recover fees 
incurred during administrative proceedings.  The Court read literally the 
language of § 1988, which allows for the recovery of fees for “any action 
or proceeding to enforce a provision of 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 of this title.”197  Because a separate action for fees did not seek 
to enforce any of these laws, § 1988 was not satisfied.  The Court defended 
this conclusion saying that it is “entirely reasonable to limit the award of 
attorney’s fees to those parties who, in order to obtain relief, found it 
necessary to file a complaint in court.”198  Moreover, the Court reasoned, 
this rule should incentivize potential civil rights defendants to resolve 
disputes quickly instead of risking a lawsuit and liability for attorney’s 
fees.199    
 
2. Fee Shifting in Environmental Cases 
 
Around the same time the Supreme Court was deciding the civil 
rights trilogy, it confronted a similar issue in an environmental case, 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air.200  In 
Delaware Valley, a public interest group filed a suit in federal court to 
compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a vehicle 
emission inspection and maintenance program (I/M Program) as required 
by the Clean Air Act (CAA).201  The parties entered into a consent decree 
pursuant to which Pennsylvania agreed to establish an I/M Program for 
                                                     
192 Id. at 244. 
193 N. C. Dep't of Transp., 479 U.S. 6 at (1986). 
194 Id. at 9. 
195 Id. at 11. 
196 See, e.g., Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy 
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 210 (1997) (noting that recent 
Supreme Court decisions are “at odds with Congress’ intent to encourage attorneys to take 
civil rights cases”); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 
GEO. L.J. 2619, 2631 n. 51 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it increasingly difficult 
for civil rights attorneys to recover attorneys’ fees.”); Silver, supra note 189, at 415-19. 
197 Crest, 479 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added). 
198 Id. at 14. 
199 North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986). 
200 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), 
supplemented, 483 U.S. 711 (1987). 
201 Id. at 549. 
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several counties in the state.202  However, implementation of the program 
did not proceed smoothly, and Delaware Valley pursued proceedings at 
the EPA to enforce the consent decree.203  As a result, the parties 
negotiated a new compliance schedule.   
Delaware Valley then moved for attorney’s fees to recoup the 
money it spent during the EPA proceedings.204  The district court granted 
the motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed relying on the “useful and 
ordinarily necessary” standard of Webb.205  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, and affirmed the lower courts on this issue.  In so doing, the 
Court began with the language of the relevant fee shifting statute, as it had 
in Casey and Webb.206  Unlike § 706(k) and § 1988, however, the fee 
shifting provision of the CAA, § 304(d), explicitly referred only to the 
“action” not to “proceedings.”207  But, the Court decided, the statutory 
language alone was not determinative of Congress’s intent.  Instead, the 
Court looked to the legislative history of the CAA and found that it used 
the terms “action” and “proceedings” interchangeably.208  More to the 
point, because § 304(d) had the same objective as §§ 706(k) and 1988—
“to promote citizen enforcement of important federal policies”—their fee 
shifting provisions should carry the same meaning.209    
After addressing the plain language and legislative history of § 
304(d), the Court turned to the mandatory/optional nature of the 
administrative proceedings.210  While the administrative proceedings in 
question were optional, the Court agreed that the work before the EPA was 
“useful and necessary” as contemplated by Webb.  Put simply, 
“participation in these administrative proceedings was crucial to the 
vindication of Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent decree.”211  
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding fees 
to the plaintiff in this case.         
Piecing together the holdings of Carey, Webb, Crest, and 
Delaware Valley, a framework emerges for deciding whether a prevailing 
party may recover attorney’s fees incurred before an administrative 
agency.212  First, the plaintiff must file a lawsuit to enforce the underlying 
rights, not an independent action solely to recover attorney’s fees.  Second, 
the court must determine if either the plain language of the fee shifting 
statute or its legislative history make clear that Congress contemplated 
fees for “proceedings,” not just lawsuits.  Finally, the court must determine 
if the administrative proceedings at issue were mandatory or optional.  
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203 Id. at 549. 
204 Id. at 553. 
205 Id. at 556. 
206 Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 557-
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209 Id. at 560. 
210 Id. at 561. 
211 Id. 
212 See Michael J. Davidson, Crest: Judicial Preclusion of an Independent Suit Solely for 
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Whereas a prevailing party is presumptively entitled to fees for mandatory 
proceedings, fees for optional proceedings are only recoverable if they 
were both “useful and ordinarily necessary” to advance the litigation.213  
 
B. Lower Courts’ Interpretation of Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
 
Fee shifting provisions are found in many different laws, and 
therefore lower courts have faced the question whether to include fees for 
work before an administrative tribunal in a number of contexts.  Examples 
include the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act (HCPA),214 the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),215 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).216   Courts have generally 
allowed the recovery of such fees in HCPA cases,217 precluded recovery 
in ERISA cases,218 and split on the issue in ADEA cases.219   A lengthy 
discussion of all of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article, so it 
addresses only the ERISA cases—which were decided most recently—in 
greater detail. 
Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund for Northern California 
was the first circuit decision in the ERISA context to address the question 
whether a prevailing party could recover attorney’s fees for administrative 
proceedings.220 Cann filed two federal lawsuits and pursued administrative 
remedies regarding his pension eligibility.221  Upon settling the merits, 
Cann requested $51,600 in attorney’s fees, some of which were incurred 
during administrative proceedings.222  Cann argued that he was entitled to 
recover such fees because the administrative proceedings were mandatory, 
i.e., exhaustion of administrative remedies was a prerequisite to filing 
suit.223  The district court nevertheless limited Cann’s recovery to fees 
incurred during the federal court actions.    
Following the framework set out by the Supreme Court, the Ninth 
Circuit began by examining the plain language of the ERISA fee shifting 
provision.224  It provided that “[i]n any action under this subchapter…by 
a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow 
a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”225  Unlike 
§ 706(k) and § 1988, the ERISA provision mentioned only “actions” and 
                                                     
213 Id. 
214 See, e.g., Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc); 
Duane M. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 861 F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir. 1988); Eggers v. Bullitt 
Cty. Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir. 1988). 
215 See, e.g., Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2003); Peterson v. Continental 
Cas. Co., 282 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2002); Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund for N. 
Cal., 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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218 See infra Part III.B (discussing ERISA cases in greater detail). 
219 See Silver, supra note 189, at 407-09. 
220 Cann v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund, 989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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not “proceedings.”226  Therefore, the court concluded, the plain language 
of the statute limits awards to fees incurred in litigation in court.227   
But the inquiry didn’t end there.  Guided by Delaware Valley, the 
court next considered the legislative history of ERISA.228  Congress’s 
intention was to promote “the soundness and stability of [pension] plans 
with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits.”229  The court 
believed that this objective would not be furthered, and might even be 
undermined, by allowing the recovery of fees for administrative 
proceedings.230  Nor, the court reasoned, was there anything else in the 
legislative history that “supported a nonliteral interpretation of [the term] 
‘action’” in the ERISA fee shifting provision.231  For these reasons, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees.  
Over the next decade, several other circuit courts faced the same 
question about fee shifting in ERISA cases.  Starting with Anderson v. 
Proctor & Gamble Co.,232 the Sixth Circuit found the reasoning in Cann 
persuasive and held that “ERISA does not authorize recovery of attorney’s 
fees for work performed during the administrative exhaustion phase of a 
benefits proceedings.”233  Likewise, in Peterson v. Continental Casualty 
Co., the Second Circuit limited recovery to attorney’s fees incurred in 
court based on the text of the ERISA fee-shifting provision.234  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Peterson court relied on dictionary definitions of 
“action,” the use of the term “action” in other provisions of the ERISA 
statute, and the decisions in Cann and Anderson.235    
 In Rego v. Westvaco Corporation,236 the Fourth Circuit reached 
the same conclusion about fee shifting in ERISA cases.  While the Rego 
court agreed with the rationale of its sister circuits, it offered an additional 
reason for not allowing the recovery of fees for administrative 
proceedings.237  Making such fees recoverable, the court suggested, would 
encourage parties to retain lawyers to represent them during administrative 
proceedings.238  And if lawyers were injected into this process, “it would 
establish a far higher degree of formality and lead to more protracted 
litigation in a great many cases.”239 
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The Eighth Circuit most recently joined this line of cases in Parke 
v. First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.240  The Parke court found it 
significant that the ERISA fee shifting provision referred only to “actions,” 
not “proceedings.”241  The court also spent a good deal of time 
distinguishing Delaware Valley.242  Not only did the environmental 
legislation at issue in Delaware Valley have a different congressional 
design, the procedural posture of the case was different.  As noted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Cann,243 the administrative proceedings in Delaware 
Valley occurred after the civil action and were necessary to enforce the 
already-litigated consent decree, whereas the administrative proceedings 
in the ERISA context pre-dated the plaintiff’s lawsuit.244   
In all of these ERISA cases, as well as in the HCPA and ADEA 
cases mentioned above,245 lower courts begin with the plain language of 
the statute and the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey to decide whether 
fees for administrative proceedings are recoverable.  As discussed in the 
next Section, however, when the Federal Circuit confronted this question 
regarding fees for PTO proceedings, it skipped the first part of the analysis 
and focused only on the inquiry from Webb—whether the administrative 
proceedings were mandatory or optional.246  Because the Federal Circuit’s 
analysis was flawed, the question whether courts may award fees for PTO 
proceedings remains open.             
 
C. Fee Shifting for PTO Proceedings   
 
The AIA vastly expanded the ability to challenge patent validity 
through administrative proceedings at the PTO.  But even before the AIA, 
various administrative proceedings were available to patent owners and 
other interested parties—including reissue, ex parte reexamination, and 
inter partes reexamination—all of which were used at times in conjunction 
with litigation.247  During this pre-AIA era, in a case called PPG Indus., 
Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit 
addressed the question about shifting fees for work before the PTO. 
 
1. PPG v. Celanese 
 
PPG Industries, the owner of patents related to electrodeposition 
of coating compositions, sued Celanese for infringement.248  Celanese 
uncovered relevant prior art during discovery, and so PPG sought reissue 
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of the patents-in-suit.249  The district court stayed the federal court action 
pending the PTO’s resolution of the reissue proceedings, and Celanese 
actively participated in the reissue proceedings as a protestor and 
intervenor.250  The PTO refused to reissue PPG’s patents because the 
claims were obvious in light of the prior art, and because PPG engaged in 
inequitable conduct by intentionally withholding this prior art during the 
initial examination.251  The district court then lifted the stay, entered 
judgment for Celanese, and Celanese moved for attorney’s fees under 35 
U.S.C. § 285.  Although the district court determined the case was 
“exceptional” and granted the motion, it did not award the full amount 
Celanese requested, including approximately $275,000 for “legal services 
rendered before the PTO in opposing PPG’s reissue applications.”252  
Celanese appealed, and the Federal Circuit reversed.     
What’s most remarkable about the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
PPG is what’s missing from it, namely any reference to the text of § 285 
or the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey.253  Instead of starting with the 
plain language of the relevant fee shifting provision—as Carey instructs 
and as all other circuit courts deciding this question have done—the 
Federal Circuit only discussed Webb and the designation of the reissue 
proceedings as mandatory or optional.254  The court held that, at least in 
this case, the reissue proceedings were mandatory because Celanese had 
to participate in them once PPG requested reissue.255  And even if 
considered optional, the court explained, the reissue proceedings were 
“useful and of a type ordinarily necessary” as contemplated in Webb.256  
Celanese, therefore, was entitled to recover the attorney’s fees incurred 
during reissue proceedings before the PTO.        
 
2. Lower Courts’ Application of PPG 
            
Since the Federal Circuit decided PPG almost three decades ago, 
this fee shifting issue has garnered little attention.  From time-to-time, 
district courts have had to decide whether to award fees for work before 
the PTO.257  In most of these reported opinions, the courts have allowed 
                                                     
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 1567.  At the time PPG was decided, third parties could participate in reissue 
proceedings pursuant to the “Dann Amendments.”  Id. at 1568.  After Congress enacted 
legislation providing for reexamination, it repealed the Dann Amendments.  Id. 
251 Id. at 1566. 
252 Id. at 1568. 
253 Interestingly, the district courts that addressed this question before the Federal Circuit’s 
PPG decision also failed to consider Carey and the plain language of § 285.  See Scott 
Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F.Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1984); PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Ky. 1987).    
254 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). 
255 Id. at 1568. 
256 Id. at 1568-69. 
257 See Deep Sky Software, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., Case No. 10-cv-1234-CAB 
(KSC), at 3-5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015); Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 2015 WL 
136142, * 9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2015); IA Labs CA, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 
1565296, *4 (D. Md. May 1, 2012); Howes v. Medical Components, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 
1193, 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
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such fees with little explanation.258  The courts may have been relying on 
PPG, but that is not always clear.    
With the passage of the AIA, the popularity of the new post-grant 
proceedings, and the rise in fee shifting motions after Octane and 
Highmark, courts are likely to face this issue on a much more regular 
basis.259  Indeed, a recent district court decision on the matter—Deep Sky 
Software, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.—received a good bit of attention 
from various commentators and was picked up by several blogs.260  In 
Deep Sky, the plaintiff filed a patent infringement action in 2010, and soon 
thereafter the defendant filed a request for inter partes reexamination.261  
The parties filed a joint motion to stay the case pending the outcome of the 
reexamination, which the court granted.262  
After the PTO cancelled all the claims of the patent, the district 
court lifted the stay and Southwest moved for attorney’s fees under § 285, 
including fees for the reexamination.263  The district court, which had 
previously determined the case was exceptional, granted the motion.  In so 
doing, the court did not examine the text of § 285, consider its legislative 
history, or discuss any of the Supreme Court cases on point.  Instead,   
relying on PPG, the court held that “the reexamination proceedings 
                                                     
258 See Deep Sky, Case No. 10-cv-1234, at 4 (“[U]nder the unique circumstances of this 
case, defendant may recover fees for the reexamination proceedings.”); IA Labs, 2012 WL 
1565296, at *4 (“[T]he Court accepts Nintendo’s calculation of the number of hours 
reasonably expended on the matter as a result of IA Labs’ baseless claim—including those 
related to the reexamination proceeding before the PTO.”); Howes, 761 F. Supp. at 1198 
(concluding that fees for reexamination proceedings were recoverable because they were 
“reasonably necessary to this litigation”).  But see Intellect Wireless, 2015 WL 136142, at 
*9 (“To the extent the present fee petition contains time for work before the USPTO, such 
time should not be included in the fee award.”). 
259 See infra Part IV.  A related issue that at least one district court has already faced is 
whether prevailing parties in patent cases can be awarded the costs (as opposed to 
attorney’s fees) associated with PTAB proceedings.  See Credit Acceptance Corp., v. 
Westlake Servs., LLC, CV 13-01523 SJO (MRWx), at 5-6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016).  In 
Credit Acceptance, the patent owner sued for infringement, and the defendant successfully 
challenged the patent in CBM before the PTAB.  The defendant then sought to recover 
costs associated with the CBM, namely $73,200 in filing fees.  Id. at 5. Despite being the 
“prevailing party,” the district court held that defendant could not recover the CBM-related 
filing fees pursuant to the Central District of California’s Local Rules, which only allowed 
fees paid to the “Clerk” to be recoverable.   Id. at 6.  Since the $73,200 in fees was paid to 
the PTO, and not the court clerk, they were not taxable costs.  Id. 
260 See, e.g., Gregory S. Cordrey, District Court Awards Defendant Its IPR-Related Fees 
Under § 285, PATENT LAWYER BLOG, http://patentlaw.jmbm.com/2015/09/district-court-
awards-defendan.html (Sept. 1, 2015); Kevin Penton, Southwest Wins Attorney Fees for 
Patent Re-examination Period, LAW 360, 
http://www.law360.com/articles/693876/southwest-wins-atty-fees-for-patent-re-
examination-period (Aug. 21, 2015); Hans Smith, Attorney Fees for Post-Grant Patent 
Challenge Proceedings Before the USPTO May Be Recoverable in Exceptional Cases 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, IP INTELLIGENCE, 
http://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2015/08/26/attorney-fees-for-post-grant-patent-
challenge-proceedings-before-the-uspto-may-be-recoverable-in-exceptional-cases-under-
35-u-s-c-%C2%A7-285/ (Aug. 26, 2015).  
261 Deep Sky, Case No. 10-cv-1234, at 1.  
262 See Deep Sky Software, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., Case No. 10-cv-1234-CAB 
(KSC), at 1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015). 
263 Id. at 2. 
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essentially substituted for work that would otherwise have been done 
before this court,” and therefore Southwest was entitled to those fees.264       
Although Deep Sky involved pre-AIA administrative proceedings 
(i.e., inter partes reexamination), no doubt district courts will approach the 
fee shifting question similarly with respect to IPR, PGR, and CBM.  Stated 
simply, courts will follow PPG and allow prevailing parties to recover fees 
incurred during PTO proceedings.  Perhaps from a policy perspective the 
Federal Circuit got it right in PPG, but its legal analysis was unsound.  The 
final Part of this Article therefore makes two suggestions for addressing 
this problem going forward.  First, it calls on either an en banc Federal 
Circuit or the Supreme Court to revisit PPG, and second it urges Congress 
to address this matter.    
 
IV. The Future of Fee Shifting for PTAB Proceedings 
 
A. The Judiciary Should Revisit PPG 
 
When the Federal Circuit decided PPG almost thirty years ago, 
the language of § 285 was the same as it is today: “The court in exceptional 
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”265  This 
language should have been the Federal Circuit’s starting point, as the 
Supreme Court explicated in Carey and its progeny.266  Of course, the 
“rule” announced in Carey is not unique to the circumstances of that case.  
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that courts begin with the 
language of the statute.267  The Federal Circuit itself has acknowledged 
this maxim time and again.268      
Yet, for unexplained reasons, the PPG court skipped this critical 
first step when interpreting § 285.  Maybe a court would choose not to 
address the statutory language if it were sufficiently clear.  But if the 
statute’s language was clear, then why would the parties be litigating about 
it in the first place?  In the end, whether such a hypothetical situation might 
arise in some other case is neither here nor there because the language of 
                                                     
264 Id. at 4.  The district court did cite one other Federal Circuit case, Cent. Soya Co. v. 
Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), for the proposition that 
attorney’s fees may include “those sums that the prevailing party incurs in the preparation 
for and performance of legal services related to the suit.”  But Soya is not on point.  In 
Soya, the question was whether courts may award expenses—such as fees for paralegals, 
expert witness fees, photocopying charges, travel expenses, etc.—or whether § 285 is 
limited to attorney’s fees.  Id. at 1577-78.  Soya did not address the question whether 
attorney’s fees for administrative proceedings are recoverable under § 285.  
265 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
266 See supra Part III.A. 
267 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 
172 (2001); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980); see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 69 (2007). 
268 See, e.g., Federal Nat. Mortgage Ass’n v. United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute.”); Associated 
Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“To determine 
Congressional intent, we begin, of course, with the language of the statutes at issue.”); 
Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute itself.”).  
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§ 285 is not clear—it does not unambiguously allow prevailing parties to 
recover fees for administrative proceedings.   
To the contrary, unlike sections 706(k) and 1988 of the Civil 
Rights Act, § 285 makes no mention of “proceedings.”269  Rather, the 
statute says only that courts may award fees in “cases.”  The term “case” 
is synonymous with “action,”270 and courts have interpreted “action” to 
mean a proceeding in court, not an administrative proceeding.271  A “case,” 
moreover, is defined as “a question contested before a court of justice” or 
“an aggregate of facts which furnishes occasion for the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of a court of justice.”272  In short, the statutory language of § 
285 does not support the Federal Circuit’s conclusion in PPG that fees 
may be awarded for PTO proceedings. 
But even where, as here, the statute is silent, courts may still award 
fees for administrative proceedings if that’s what Congress intended.273  
The purpose of § 285 is “to compensate the prevailing party for its 
monetary outlays in the prosecution or defense of the suit.” 274 To be sure, 
allowing prevailing parties in patent litigation to recover fees for PTO 
proceedings would be “compensatory.”  However, it’s impossible to say—
as the Supreme Court did in Delaware Valley—that Congress intended for 
these fees to be recoverable because, at the time § 285 was enacted, these 
PTO proceedings did not even exist.275   
Because neither the plain language of § 285 nor its legislative 
history support the recovery of fees for work before the PTO, the Federal 
Circuit’s legal analysis in PPG was wrong.  Under the Supreme Court’s 
framework, the Federal Circuit never should have reached the question 
whether PTO proceedings are mandatory or optional because there was no 
explicit or implicit statutory authority for awarding fees for administrative 
proceedings.276  Thus, the Supreme Court or an en banc panel of the 
Federal Circuit should revisit and reverse PPG.   
For all its flaws, however, the PPG decision is sound as a matter 
of policy, especially in light of the objectives of the AIA.  One purpose of 
the AIA was to address the country’s bad patent problem, which Congress 
                                                     
269 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000(e)-5(k).   
270 CASE, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ED. 2014) (defining “case” as “[a] civil or 
criminal proceeding, action, cause, suit, or controversy, at law or in equity”) (emphasis 
added).   
271 See, e.g., Peterson v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 282 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Used in a 
statute, the term ‘action’ traditionally connotes a formal adversarial proceeding under the 
jurisdiction of a court of law.”); Cann v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund, 989 F.2d 316, 
316 (9th Cir. 1993) (“action” generally refers to “proceedings in court, not administrative 
proceedings even though necessary and valuable”). 
272 BLACK’S, supra note 269 (emphasis added).  
273 See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 
559, (1986). 
274 Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also 
Codex Corp. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 541 F.Supp. 1198, 1201 (D.Mass.1982) (“The 
compensatory purpose of § 285 is best served if the prevailing party is allowed to recover 
his reasonable expenses in prosecuting the entire action.”). 
275 Instead, the legislative history indicates that Congress believed fee shifting in patent 
cases would “enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged infringer” and deter 
willful infringement “by anyone thinking that all he would be required to pay if he loses 
the suit would be a royalty.”  S. Rep. No. 1503 (1946), in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1386, 1387.   
276 See supra Part III.A (setting out the Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing fee 
shifting for administrative proceedings).  
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believed was hampering innovation and technological advancement.277  To 
that end, Congress created PTAB proceedings as a quicker and less 
expensive alternative to district court litigation.278  Congress’s goal, in 
other words, was to encourage the use of PTAB proceedings to invalidate 
bad patents. 
While various means could be used to encourage PTAB 
challenges, fee shifting is an important one.  Simply put, when there’s a 
possibility of recovering attorney’s fees, parties are more likely to seek 
PTAB review in the first place, and more likely to pursue such challenges 
to a final decision.279  On the other hand, if there’s no possibility of fee 
shifting, parties may choose a different path.  They may challenge a patent 
only in federal court (i.e., not at the PTAB), settle the case (thereby 
allowing an invalid patent to remain in force), or not challenge the patent 
at all.280   
In short, the policy underlying PPG makes good sense because 
allowing prevailing parties to recoup attorney’s fees for PTAB 
proceedings furthers the aims of the AIA.  But even assuming the Federal 
Circuit wanted to award fees for work at the PTAB, its hands are tied by 
the plain language of § 285, the statute’s legislative history, and Supreme 
Court precedent.  Accordingly, it is up to Congress to provide a legislative 
fix.  
 
B. Congress Should Allow for Recovery of PTAB Fees  
 
Since 2013, several bills have been introduced in Congress 
proposing broader fee shifting for patent cases.281  Many provisions in 
these bills have been the subject of significant debate, including whether 
fee shifting should be mandatory or discretionary, how to recover fees 
from the “real party in interest,” whether to adopt a one-way or two-way 
fee shifting scheme, the standard for fee shifting, and whether certain 
entities (e.g., universities) should be exempted from the fee shifting 
provisions.282  Yet, none of these bills tackles the question whether 
prevailing parties should be able to recover fees incurred during PTAB 
proceedings. 
If Congress ultimately adopts one of these fee shifting bills, it 
should permit courts to award fees for IPR, PGR, and CBM (e.g., by 
including the word “proceedings” in the statute).  Congress should also 
                                                     
277 See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S5409-10 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Schumer) (“[T]he bill streamlines review of patents to ensure that the poor-quality patents 
can be weeded out through administrative review rather than costly litigation.”); 157 Cong. 
Rec. S5433 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Se. Grassley) (arguing that post-grant 
administrative review will “protect inventor’s rights,” “strengthen patent quality,” “reduce 
costs,” “curb litigation abuses”, and “improve certainty for investors and innovators”). 
278 See Matal, supra note 158, at 653. 
279 See supra Part I (discussing how different fee shifting regimes influence litigation 
conduct). 
280 See id. 
281 See supra Part II.D (introducing various fee shifting proposals). 
282 See Patent Progress, Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, 
available at http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-
progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (collecting and summarizing patent reform bills 
that have been introduced since 2013). 
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provide district courts some guidance on when such fees are appropriately 
granted.  For example, district courts might be more likely to award fees 
for PTAB proceedings if they simplified the litigation or substituted for 
work that otherwise would have been done before the court.283  On the 
other hand, if PTAB proceedings were duplicative or brought for 
harassment purposes, recovery should not be allowed.284 While such 
decisions should be left to the discretion of the court, laying out factors in 
the statute for the court to consider would be helpful.     To be completely 
upfront, I am not advocating for the passage of any of these fee shifting 
bills.  But if Congress decides to revamp § 285, it should take that 
opportunity to clarify this issue about recouping administrative fees.  
Even in the event Congress does not pass comprehensive fee 
shifting legislation, it should still address this issue.  Patent litigants who 
employ PTAB proceedings in a way that advances the AIA’s objectives 
ought to recover their attorney’s fees.285  To allow for that, Congress would 
need to amend § 285—at the very least—to refer to “proceedings” in the 
text of the statute.  Ideally, as noted above, Congress would also provide 
some guidance to help courts discern when fees for administrative work 
are warranted and when they are not.     
One last suggestion is that Congress consider granting the PTAB 
power to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, as it has done for a 
number of other agencies.286  That way, parties who litigate only at the 
PTAB (and not also in federal court) can recover fees.  This is important 
because, while most IPRs and CBMs involve a parallel federal court 
                                                     
283 See, e.g., Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 562 (“We agree that participation in these 
proceedings was crucial to the vindication of Delaware Valley’s rights under the consent 
decree and find that compensation for these activities was entirely proper and well within 
the ‘zone of discretion’ afforded to the District Court.”); Deep Sky Software, Inc. v. 
Southwest Airlines Co., Case No. 10-cv-1234-CAB (KSC), at 4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2015). 
284 See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 932-33 (2015) 
(discussing how parties have abused PTAB proceedings); Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 
161, at 55 (explaining that some PTAB petitions may be used for harassment and delay). 
285 See Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 (“It would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant 
who is unsuccessful or only partially successful in obtaining state or local remedies, but to 
deny an award to the complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress’ plan that federal 
policies be vindicated at the state or local level.”).    
286 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (“In any administrative proceeding 
brought under this section, or any court proceeding arising therefrom, or any civil action 
under this section, the administrative law judge or the court, as the case may be, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney’s fee and costs.”) (emphasis added); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act  of 1977, 
30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (“Whenever an order is issued sustaining the complainant’s charges 
under this subsection, a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses 
(including attorney’s fees) as determined by the Commission to have been reasonably 
incurred by the miner, applicant for employment or representative of miners for, or in 
connection with, the institution and prosecution of such proceedings shall be assessed 
against the person committing such violation.”) (emphasis added); Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 928(a)-(b) (“If . . . the person seeking benefits 
shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attorney at law in successful prosecution of 
his claim, there shall be awarded . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee against the employer or 
carrier in an amount approved by the deputy commissioner, Board, or court, as the case 
may be.”) (emphasis added); Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. § 41305(e) (authorizing the 
Federal Maritime Commission to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
any action brought under the act). 
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suit,287 some do not.  Moreover, with respect to PGRs, there’s less likely 
to be parallel litigation since they must be initiated within nine months of 
the patent’s issuance.288  Allowing the PTAB to award fees would further 
the AIA’s objective of encouraging parties to use PTAB proceedings as a 
substitute for, rather than in addition to, federal court litigation.289  Plus, 
having the agency decide fee motions avoids the difficulty courts face 
when assessing a fee request for work conducted before a different 




The PTAB is transforming the way patent litigation is conducted 
in the United States.  Where patents were once litigated solely in federal 
court, today the PTAB plays a key role in resolving patent disputes.  While 
PTAB proceedings are far less expensive than federal court litigation,291 
parties still incur significant attorney’s fees adjudicating before the PTO.  
These administrative fees should be recoverable by prevailing patent 
litigants, but Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that § 285’s plain 
language and legislative history preclude such an award.  Therefore, in 
furtherance of the AIA’s objective of encouraging PTAB proceedings as 
a substitute for federal court litigation, Congress should enact legislation 
entitling parties who prevail at the PTAB to recover attorney’s fees.  
 
                                                     
287 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 151, at 103. 
288 Vishnubhakat, supra note 116. 
289 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1284-85 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the PTAB was meant to serve as a “surrogate for district court 
litigation”); Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 161, at 70 (noting the “intended uses of IPR 
and CBM review as substitutes for federal court litigation”).   
290 See, e.g., PPG Indus. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties, Co., 658 F.Supp. 555, 561 (W.D. 
Ky. 1987) (“[I]t would be very difficult or almost impossible for the court to award those 
fees accurately regarding the conduct of a separate action before a different kind of 
tribunal.”).  Notably, the PTAB did award attorney’s fees recently, albeit in a different 
context.  In RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time LLC, the PTAB ordered the patent 
owner to pay $13,500 in attorney’s fees as a sanction for violating a protective order.  See 
IPR 2015-011750, 01751 & 01752.  In so doing, the PTAB relied on C.F.R. § 42.12, which 
allows the Board to impose sanctions against a party for “misconduct.”   
291 Vishnubhakat, et al., supra note 161, at 59 (“Thus far, the new AIA proceedings do 
appear to be substantially cheaper than district court litigation.”). 
